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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The instant case agrees with the views expressed by the majority of
cases on point. They feel Indians are within a class of persons liable to
be particularly injured by intoxicating liquors. The dissenters base their
argument on the fact that this statute' 2 was passed many years ago when
Indians were lawless. The courts have never attempted, in recent years,
to justify the conclusion that Indians are a class of people peculiarly liable
to be injured by intoxicants.
It is obvious that the court, in the principal case, has not attempted
to use any aggressiveness in pioneering a change in a law that is definitely
outdated, but has been content to sustain this archaic legislation-on
grounds which factually may no longer exist. The original reason for such
Indian legislation was to protect the Indians, since they were considered
savages, with no education, not used to living in the midst of modem
civilization.' 3 The status of Indians over one hundred years ago brought
about prohibitive liquor legislation for their benefit; but there is perhaps,
no reason for a court, at the present time, to rely on cases passed forty
to one hundred years ago, 14 since Indians of today, remote from the tribal
state, are as capable as any other race of coping with the vices of our
modem civilization.
The trend today is toward a stricter interpretation of the word "reasonable," when a racial, or other irrational basis is involved, as has been
evidenced by decisions against class legislation affecting negroes.' 5 Judging
by this trend and keeping in mind the transition Indians have made from
a veritable savage state, to respected members of a civilized society, it
seems likely that statutes denying Indians the privilege to buy liquor will
come under direct challenge and be declared invalid in the near future,
at least with reference to the sanction of the Federal Constitution.
Mons WATSKY

COURTS-APPEALS OF ORDERS-STAY OF ACTION
In an action for an accounting, the defendant moved for a stay of
the action pursuant to Section 3 of the United States Arbitration Act.'
The district court found that the agreement under which arbiration was
sought did not constitute an agreement to arbitrate and entered an order
12. See note 1 supra.
13. 39 YALE L.J. 307 (1930).
14. See notes 3 and 6 supra.
15. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 686 (1954) (Denying
negroes the right to attend the same schools as whites was "unreasonable" class legislation.); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
1. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1947): "If any suit or proceedings be brought in any of the
courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement
in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being
satisfied that issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had
in accordance with the terms of the agreement ..

"
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denying defendant's motion. An appeal taken from this order was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2 Held,
such an order is not appealable as a final decision or as an interlocutory
order refusing an injunction?. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger,
-- U.S.--, 75 S.Ct. 249 (1955).
Where an order is entered which clearly grants or refuses injunctive
relief, no questions as to appealability arises. 4 However, the order must
be conclusive as to its effect upon the substantive rights of the parties
for the courts to deem it the granting or refusing of an injunction. 5 It is
clear also, that an interlocutory order entered in a court of equity, staying
temporarily or permanently the proceedings of another court, is appealable.8
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a ruling
of a district court sitting in equity, pertaining to a matter on the law
side of the court, had the same effect as being issued by a separate and
distinct court.7 In Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co.,s suit at law
was brought upon an insurance policy, and the defendant interposed as a
defense an equitable counterclaim praying for rescission of the policy,
and included a motion to try the equitable issue prior to the issue raised
by the complaint. It was held that such an order requiring or refusing to
require that an equitable counterclaim be heard first, in effect grants or
refuses an injunction restraining proceedings at law precisely as if the
order-' restrained or refused to restrain a suit at law in a separate court.
Though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided for only one form
of action, 9 this distinction between law and equity still prevailed,' 0 and
the Enclow case was followed where similar facts were presented before
the Court after adoption of the Rules.", It was held, shortly after the
2. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 347 U.S. 942 (1954).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1948): "The courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions...." 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1) (1948) permits "appeals
from interlocutory order . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving
injunctions. . ."
4. General Electric Company v. Marcel Rare Metals Company, 287 U.S. 430
(1932); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
Since an order granting or denying a stay under Sec. 3 of the Arbitration Act is
not a final decision (Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp.,
293 U.S. 449, (1935) this discussion will be limited to the application of the statute
allowing appeals from interlocutory orders.
5. Morganstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Corporation, 181 F.2d 160 (3d Cir.
1950) (a denial of a motion for summary judgment in a suit to enjoin the use of a
trademark, was not the refusal of an injunction).
6. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kraft, 200 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1953);
accord Sullivan v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 167 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1948).
7. King Mechanism and Engineering Co. v. Western Wheeled Scraper Co., 59
F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1932).
8. 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
9. FEn. R. Civ. P. 2.
10. Bereslavsky v. Kloeb, 162 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1947); Coca-Cola Co. v. DixieCola Laboratories, Inc., 155 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1946); Commercial Nat. Bank in Shreveport v. Parsons, 144 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1944); Carter Coal Co. v. Litz, 54 F. Supp.
115 (W.D. Va. 1943); Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 1 F.R.D. 713
(D.N.J. 1941).
11. Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Corp., 317 U.S. 188 (1942).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Enelow case, that an application for a stay pursuant to Section 3 of the
Arbitration Act is in the nature of an equitable plea, and an order refusing2
to stay an action at law is appealable as it in effect refuses an injunction;'
but an order staying an admiralty action and requiring the parties to submit
to arbitration is not appealable.' 3 In 1948, the Supreme Court held that
an order granting or refusing a stay of an action, equitable in nature, is
not an order granting or refusing an injunction. 14 To the same effect,
where a district court has before it a matter cognizable at law, an order
granting or refusing a stay in the proceedings to await the determination
of matters pending elsewhere, has been held not to be an order granting
or refusing an injunction.Y5 In such cases, the action of the court is said
to be a mere exercising of its inherent power to control the litigation
before it.10
The rule laid down in the instant case has the effect of allowing
an appeal to be taken from an order granting or denying a defendant's
motion for a stay pursuant to Section 3 of the Arbitration Act, only if the
action in which the order is entered is one cognizable at law. It is submitted
that this rule does not lend itself towards attainment of the purpose of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that is, "To secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."'17 It is unlikely that many
litigants would take an appeal after final judgment in order to challenge a
district court's order granting or denying a stay, due to the expense and
delay involved. In practical effect then, the interpretation of alleged arbitration agreements and the determination of whether or not an issue in a controversy will be submitted to arbitration, is left completely in the hands of the
trial judge. It has been suggested that "where the postponement of appellate
review is wasteful or threatens the substantive rights of the parties, some
procedure for prompt review should be devised."' 8 If the action brought
in the instant case had been one cognizable at law, an appeal would have
been allowed. It seems odd to the writer, that appealability should rest
12. Shanferoke Coal and Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U.S. 449
(1935); Markel Electric Products, Inc. v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
of America, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1953); Wilco v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953);
International Union United Furniture Workers of America v. Colonial Hardwood
Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); American Locomotive Co. v. Chemical
Research Corp., 171 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1947); Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876
(6th Cir. 1944); Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943).
But see, Hudson Lumber Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 181 F.2d 929 (9th Cir.
1950) (an appeal was allowed from an order granting a stay under the Arbitration Act
in suit for injunctive relief).
13. Schoenamsgruber v. Hamberg American Line, 294 US. 454 (1935).
14. City of Morgantown v. Royal Insurance Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1948).
15. Bechard v. National Power and Light Co., 164 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1947);
Dowling Bros. Distilling Co. v. United States, 153 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1946); United
States v. Horns, 147 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1945); Triangle Conduit and Cable Co. v.
National Electric Products Corp., 127 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1942); Cover v. Schwartz,
112 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1940).
16. Ibid.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
18. Note, Proposals for Interlocutory Appeals, 58 YALE L.J. 1186 (1949).
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solely upon whether the actiou in which the order is entered is equitable
or legal in nature. The court itself admits that "the incongruity of taking
[appellate] jurisdiction from a stay in a law type and denying jurisdiction
in an equity type proceeding springs from the persistence of outmoded
procedural differentiations."'9
ALVIN S. SHERMAN

TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCELAST CLEAR CHANCE
Plaintiff brought an action for the wrongful death of her husband
as a result of a head-on collision between the autos driven by the defendant
and the deceased. The collision occurred as the defendant approached the
deceased while the latter's auto was swerving from side to side on the
highway. Held, defendant was faced with an emergency situation and the
doctrine of last clear chance was not applicable. Burdette v. Phillips,
76 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1954).
Under the prevailing Florida law contributory negligence is a bar
to recovery.' However, the doctrine of the last clear chance mitigates
the harshness of this common law ruling, by allowing a negligent plaintiff
to recover from a negligent defendant, 2 where the latter by exercising little
care could prevent or avoid injuring the plaintiff, who by his own negligence
has placed himself in a position of peril.3 The doctrine of last clear chance
is an extension of the rule of contributory negligence and is not an exception
to it., The contributory negligence of the injured party will not defeat
recovery if the defendant, by exercising ordinary care, might have avoided
the consequences of the injured person's negligence.5 When a case arises
where the facts arc not in dispute and are absolutely conclusive, the
19. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, -

U.S.

, 75 S. Ct. 249,

254 (1955).
1.The doctrine of contributory negligence is not modified by statute in Florida,
and is a complete defense in an action for damage for personal injuries based on
negligence.

General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.Frost, 76 F2d 127, 128 (5th Cir.

1935); Cornell v. First National Bank, 121 Fla. 192, 163 So. 482 (1935); Florida
Southern Ry. v, Herst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892).
2. Consumer's Lumber and Veneer Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Rv., 117 F.2d 329
(5th Cir. 1943); Lindsay v.Thomas, 12 Fla. 293. 174 So. 418 (1937).
3. White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 190 So. 446 (1939).
Dunn Bus Service v.
McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 128 So. 865 (1937); Merchant's Transportation v. Daniels,
109 Fla. 496, 502, 149 So. 401 (1933).
4.Merchant's Transportation v. Daniels, 109 Fla. 496,502, 149 So. 401 (1933)
"It [the doctrine] does not permit one to recover in spite of his contributory negligence, but merely operates to relieve the negligence of a plaintiff.
which otherwise
would be regarded as contributory, from its character as such."
5. A.B.C. Truck Lines v. Kenemer, 247 Ala. 543, 25 So.2d 511 (1946); Gardner
v. Union Oil Co. of California, 216 Cal. 197, 13 P.2d 915 (1932); Baker v. Reid, 57
A.2d 103 (Del. 1948); Nagel v. Britthauer, 230 Iowa 207, 298 N.W. 852 (1941);
Harrison v. Eastern Michigan, Motor Bus Co., 257 Mich. 329, 241 N.W. 131 (1932);
Schaaf v. Coen, 131 Ohio St. 279, 2 N.E. 2d 605 (1936).

